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ELECTIONS-PRIMARY PETITION REQUIREMENTS*-

[E]ach political party shall have the right to select its own candidates,
and shall have such protection as the law can afford in exercising that
right. To this end it was necessary, and no doubt within the power of
the legislature, to prescribe certain qualifications.'
One of these "qualifications" which the New Mexico Legislature has
prescribed is that any person who has not been nominated by his
political party or convention may file a declaration of candidacy together with a nominating petition signed by qualified electors who
are members of his party in order to have his name placed on the
ballot. Section 3-11-7 of the New Mexico Statutes 2 requires that:
The petition shall be signed by a number of qualified electors resident
in one-half [2] of the counties in the state equal to at least three per
cent [3%] of the votes cast for the office for which said petition is being
circulated, at the last general election held for such office in each of
the counties wherein such petition is circulated.
In State ex rel. Palmer v. Miller,3 the petitioner sought to have his
name placed on the ballot of the Democratic Party as a candidate for
the office of United States Senator pursuant to section 3-11-7. The
petitioner was advised that his name would not be placed on the
ballot because his petition did not have the required number of
signatures. In his writ of mandamus to the supreme court, 4 the petitioner alleged that section 3-11-7 required a number of signatures on
the petition equal to or greater than three per cent of the votes cast
for the Democratic candidate for the Senate in the 1958 general election, and not three per cent of the votes cast for all candidates for the
* State ex rel. Palmer v. Miller, 391 P.2d 416 (N.M. 1964). N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-11-7
(Supp. 1963).
1. Roberts v. Cleveland, 48 N.M. 226, 229, 149 P.2d 120, 122 (1944).
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 3-11-7 (Supp. 1963).
3. 391 P.2d 416 (N.M. 1964).
4. N.M. Const. art. 6, § 3, grants the supreme court original jurisdiction to issue, hear,
and determine mandamus actions. It is the declared policy of the New Mexico Supreme
Court "not to exercise its original jurisdiction in the matter of granting the prerogative
writs, in the absence of some controlling necessity, of which it is the sole judge . ... "
State ex rel. Capitol Addition Bldg. Comm'n v. Connelly, 39 N.M. 312, 314, 46 P.2d 1097,
1098 (1935), citing State ex rel. Owen v. Van Stone, 17 N.M. 41, 121 Pac. 611 (1912). In
the Palmer decision, the supreme court noted the need for immediate and final litigation
on the issues if Palmer were to have his name placed on the ballot, and recognized it as
a "controlling necessity" when it said: "[T]he matter has been briefed and argued and
is now ripe for decision which, because of the exigencies of time, must not be delayed."
391 P.2d at 416.
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Senate in that election. The supreme court found against the petitioner holding that " '3% of the votes cast for the office . . . at the
last general election . . .' can mean nothing except 3 % of the vote

for all candidates." 5
The petitioner alleged in the alternative that the phrase "the last
general election held for such office," contained in section 3-11-7,
referred to the 1958 general election, and not the latest or 1960
general election; because the office the petitioner sought was last
voted upon in the 1958 general election." The petitioner had stipulated, however, that if the total vote was the criteria upon which
the percentage was to be figured, his petitions were insufficient. The
supreme court found the standard was the total vote. They stated,
therefore, that "no discussion of the additional equally interesting
and perplexing problem of whether the 1958 or 1960 election controlled, is required." 7 The purpose of this comment is to discuss the
issue of which election year is to control and suggest guidelines for
future litigants. This issue should be resolved in favor of the general election for the expiring term of office; or, in terms of the
Palmercase, the 1958 general election.
The respondent argued that "the last general election for such
office" is the same as the latest general election for that type of
office, such as senator, corporation commissioner, or supreme court
justice, on the grounds that "the number of votes cast at the last
general election would bear a closer relation to any recent growth
or decline in population than would any earlier election. ' 8 The
respondent relied upon Magoon v. Heath,9 a California case, to
support his argument. Magoon should not be relied upon, however,
for three principal reasons: (1) the peculiar circumstances of that
case do not apply in New Mexico; (2) the Magoon decision con5. State ex rel. Palmer v. Miller, 391 P.2d 416, 418 (N.M. 1964).
6. Each state of the United States has two senators as provided for in article I,
section 3 of the United States Constitution. This section also provides that the Senate
"shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes . . . so that one-third may be
chosen every second year . . . ." The senators from the same state are not put into the

same classes; and the senatorial election for a full term, six years, cannot occur for
both senators at the same time. 1 Haynes, The Senate of the United States 5 (1960).
The petitioner sought to have his name placed on the ballot for the New Mexico senate
seat vacated by the death of Senator Dennis Chavez, who had been reelected in 1958.
Senator Clinton Anderson was reelected to the other Senate position in 1960.
7. State ex rel. Palmer v. Miller, 391 P.2d 416, 419 (N.M. 1964).
8. Brief for Respondent, p. 14, State ex rel. Palmer v. Miller, supra note 7.
9. 79 Cal. App. 632, 250 Pac. 583 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1926). The Magoon case was
cited as controlling in Lynn v. City Council, 105 Cal. App. 182, 286 Pac. 1082 (2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1930).
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cerned a petition for recall and not a petition to have a name placed
on the primary election ballot; and (3) the policy that the "latest
vote" reflects population changes, relied on by the court in Magoon,
is erroneous.
The Magoon decision involved a petition for recall of four city
trustees. The applicable California statute stated that the number
of signatures required for a recall petition should be based on a
percentage "of the entire vote cast . . . for all candidates for the
office . . . at the last preceding regular municipal election at which
such officer was voted for."' 1 An earlier California case" had interpreted this statute to mean that the proportion of signatures
needed for a recall petition was to be based upon the vote cast in2
the regular election at which the officer subject to recall was elected.'
The court in Magoon, however, refused to accept this interpretation. The court said that because of the population increase, the vote
at the latest regular municipal election would be larger than any
previous election; and that the legislature, therefore, must have
intended to use the number of votes cast in the latest election for
the type of office in question in determining the proportion of signatures needed for a recall petition."
The facts in Magoon, however, reveal that one of the officers
whom the petition sought to recall had not been elected in a regular
city election, but at a special election held in 1923. The standard
upon which the required number of signatures for a petition was to
be determined, "the regular municipal election at which such officer
was voted for," would not have applied to the one officer elected
in 1923, since he was not elected at a regular municipal election.'4
10. Cal. Laws Extra Sess. 1911, ch. 32, § 1, at 128:

[The] petition shall be signed by qualified voters equal in number to at least
twenty-five per cent of the entire vote cast within such city or town for all candidates for the office which the incumbent sought to be removed occupies, at
the last preceding regular municipal election at which such officer was voted for.
11. Robinson v. Anderson, 26 Cal. App. 644,147 Pac. 1182 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1915).
12. 147 Pac. at 1183:

[T]he proportion of signatures required which set in motion the recall should
be based upon the vote cast at the regular election at which the officer was
elected, rather than a subsequent election for other trustee offices . ...
13. Magoon v. Heath, 79 Cal. App. 632, 250 Pac. 583, 584 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1926)

[I]n providing that it should be the last general municipal election we think it
is apparent that they [the legislature] had in mind that in the rapidly growing
incorporated cities and towns the vote cast at the last regular municipal election
might be considerably larger than at previous regular municipal elections and
that the phrase 'at which such officer was voted for,' in the act, is that office.
14. Cal. Laws Extra Sess. 1911, ch. 32, § 1, at 128.
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The petition had been signed by a large number of registered voters
which indicated a strong intent to recall these four city trustees;
and the court, therefore, was not about to exempt one of them because the statute had not provided for the recall of officers elected
in special elections.'" If the specially elected trustee was to be subject to recall under the California statute, the votes cast in the
latest municipal general election for the office in question would
have to be the standard upon which the required number of signatures for a petition was to be determined.
A standard based upon the literal interpretation of the California
statute also would make it extremely difficult to determine how
many signatures would be necessary before there could be a recall.
In order to have a recall, the statute required signatures of "twentyfive per cent of the entire vote cast within such city or town for all
candidates for the office which the incumbent sought to be removed
occupies." In Magoon, there were four "incumbents" who had been
elected in three different elections. 6 If the court, then, had not used
the votes cast at the one election, the latest election, but instead had
followed the dictates of the statute, the number of signatures would
have been based on a percentage of all the votes cast in all the
elections for all the candidates who ran for the four trustee positions in question. This method is much more cumbersome than the
one applied by the California court, i.e., taking a percentage of the
votes cast in the latest election.
The Magoon case should also be distinguished from Palmer because it involved a recall statute. The person seeking to have his
name placed on the primary election ballot is only required to show
that he has a sufficient number of supporters within his political
party, and that it is worthwhile to print his name on the ballot. A
person who is being recalled, however, is an elected official. A larger
percentage of the entire vote cast must be required in order to
demonstrate that there is a substantial demand among the elective
body to recall this officer. The proportion of votes required is not
simply to test whether a man has a "fighting chance" of being
elected by his party, but whether a large enough percentage of all
15. If one of the officials could not be subjected to recall, the petition would have to
have been severed in order to have it apply only to the other three trustees; and
severance would have made the petition ineffectual. This, then, was possibly another
reason why the court chose the standard it did-to include all four of the trustees in
the petition and avoid having to dismiss the entire action.
16. One of the trustees subject to recall was elected at the 1922 general election; two
at the 1924 general election ; and one at a special election in 1923.
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the voters want to remove an elected official from office. The process used to calculate the number of signatures needed to remove a
man from office, therefore, should not be the same as that used
where a man is only trying to prove that he has a right to have his
name placed on a primary election ballot. In support of this, the
court in Magoon stated that
the intent of the Legislature in providing for 25 per cent of the entire vote cast was to give some assurance that there was a substantial
demand for the removal of an elective officer before the recall might
be invoked. 17

The court's main argument in Magoon is that the latest election
should be used to reflect the larger vote of the growing cities. This
might hold true for an election in the city, even though this presumes
constant growth, and also presumes that the election turnout will
always reflect this change. Whether or not it is true for a municipal
election, statistics' 8 show that the last general election for a state
office does not necessarily reflect a change in population; and for
this reason, the court's argument in Magoon and the respondent's
argument in Palmer are without merit.
The population of New Mexico, from 1950 to 1960, increased
from 681,187 to 951,023."9 All of the state elections during that
period, however, do not reflect the change. For example, in the
1958 gubernatorial election, the total number of votes cast was
205,048 ;20 while in1956, a presidential election year, the total number of votes cast for the gubernatorial position was 251,751.21 In
the 1962 gubernatorial election, 247,135 votes were cast for the
two candidates, 22 as compared to 305,542 votes cast for the two
candidates for governor in the earlier 1960 election,23 which was
also a presidential election year. The voting statistics of the congressional elections in New Mexico further support the fact that a
17. Magoon v. Heath, 79 Cal. App. 632, 250 Pac. 583, 584 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1926).
(Emphasis added.)
18. See Part A of 1 U.S. Bureau of Census, Dep't of Commerce, 1960 Census of
Population (1961) ; State of New Mexico, Official Election Returns (N.M. Secretary of
State 1942-1960).
19. Chart 33-5 in 1960 Census of Population, op. cit. supra note 18.
20. 5 Governmental Affairs Institute, American Votes, 1962, at 265 (1964). In the
1958 gubernatorial election, Edwin L. Mechem received 101,567 votes, and the Democratic candidate, John Burroughs, received 103,481 votes.
21. Ibid. In the 1956 gubernatorial election Edwin L. Mechem received 131,488 votes,
and John F. Simms received 120,263 votes.
22. Ibid. Edwin L. Mechem-16,184 votes; Jack M. Campbell-130,933 votes.
23. Ibid. Edwin L. Mechem-153,765 votes; John Burroughs-151,777 votes.
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change in population is not necessarily reflected by the number of
votes cast in the latest election.24 The legislature, therefore, could
not have meant that "the last general election for such office" should
be the latest general election for that type of office in order to reflect the growth in population; because, as the facts show, the latest
general election in many instances does not reflect the change.
An even greater problem would arise if the standard used in section 3-11-7 were the latest general election for a general type of
office instead of the last election for the expiring term of the particular office. Some state offices have staggered terms. For example,
one of the senators from New Mexico, Senator Clinton P. Anderson, was reelected in 1960 and will serve until 1966, while the other
senator was elected in 1964, and will serve until 1970. Staggered
terms are also used in the State Corporation Commission 25 and the
supreme court.20 The following hypothetical is set out to show the
problems which might arise with respect to staggered term positions if the standard used in section 3-11-7 is the latest election held
for that general type of office: In 1970, two justices will be elected
to the supreme court.2 7 In 1972, one justice will be elected. If, in
the latter election, a person attempted to have his name placed on
the ballot pursuant to section 3-11-7, and the votes cast for all candidates in the latest general election for that general type of office
was the standard used, the person seeking to have his name placed
on the ballot would have to obtain a number of signatures based
on the votes cast for all the candidates who ran for the two supreme
24. In one congressional position in 1962, 244,913 votes were cast for the congres-

sional candidates. Jack C. Redman polled 116,262 votes, and Joseph M. Montoya, the
Democratic candidate, received 128,651. In 1960, however, 301,048 votes were cast for
the members of Congress running for that same congressional position; Edward V. Balcomb received 123,683 votes, and Joseph M. Montoya, 176,514. 197,846 votes were cast
for all four congressional candidates in 1958; and in the earlier congressional election of
1956, another presidential election year, 244,344 votes were cast for the four candidates
for Congress. In 1958, William A. Thompson received 72,922 votes, and his opponent,
Joseph M. Montoya, polled 124,924 votes. George W. McKim received 70,925 votes, and
the Democratic candidate, Thomas G. Morris, received 115,928 votes. The four candidates who polled 244,344 votes in 1956 were: Dudley Cornell, 114,719 and John J.
Dempsey, 129,625; Forrest S. Atchley, 112,531 and Antonio Fernandez, 128,330. 5 Governmental Affairs Institute, op. cit. supra note 20, at 269.
25. N.M. Const. art. 11, § 2.

26. N.M. Const. art. 4, § 4.
27. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 16-2-1 (1953), increased the number of supreme court justices
from three to five, each serving an eight-year term. N.M. Laws 1929, ch. 9, § 2,
provided that in order to make this increase, two justices would be elected at the 1930
general election and every eight years thereafter. Two were elected in 1962, and one
will be elected in the next three general elections beginning with the 1964 general election.
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court positions in 1970. This would not be the case, however, if a
person sought to have his name placed on the ballot for supreme
court justice in the 1974 election, since the latest general election
for that type of office was the 1972 election in which only one
supreme court justice was elected. Therefore, if the standard employed in section 3-11-7 is the latest general election for the general
type of office for which the candidate is running, an impossible
burden may be placed on a candidate who tries to get his name on
the ballot at the wrong time. 2 This result will not occur if the last
general election for the term of office to be filled is the standard;
since this can refer only to the election of a single person, the person
whose term of office is expiring, which in the hypothetical would
be the 1966 election for supreme court justice.
On the other hand, if the standard were the latest general election for the particular type of office in question, and if it were held
that only the number of votes cast for one position could be used,
there would still be a problem for the candidate who tried to have
his name placed on the ballot under section 3-11-7. For instance, if
there had been more than one office of his type in the last election
(like the person in the hypothetical above who sought to have his
name placed on the ballot in 1972), there would be no way to
determine which candidates' votes to use in obtaining the required
percentage. No problem would arise, however, if the general election for that term of office which is expiring was the standard
determining the required number of signatures since the candidate
could refer to the definite number of votes cast for the candidates
who ran for the office he is seeking. The burden of all candidates
28. Situations have occurred throughout New Mexico's election history which might
have led to the same problem as that raised in the hypothetical, i.e., where a man seeks
to have his name placed on the ballot for an office which had two positions filled in the
last general election. In 1948, and again in 1952, two candidates ran for corporation
commissioner, one to fill a four-year term due to a vacancy in office, while the other ran
for the regularly elected office due to the expiration of a six-year term. State of New
Mexico, Official Returns of the 1948 Elections, at 12; State of New Mexico, Official Returns of the 1952 Elections, at 2.
A candidate's burden might even be triple that of a later candidate if "the last general
election for such office" in § 3-11-7 meant all the votes cast for all the candidates in the
latest election for the general type of office in question. If a candidate were to try and
have his name placed on the ballot, under § 3-11-7, for the office of supreme court justice
in the general election which followed the election of two justices and a third election
to fill the vacancy of another supreme court justice (as provided in N.M. Const. art. 6,
§4), then this candidate would have to have a number of signatures based on a percentage of all the votes cast for all the candidates running for the three offices in that
earlier election.
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in the future would be equalized because the last general election
for that term of office designates one position, and only the votes
cast for that position.
Another argument in favor of using the last general election for
the expiring term of office as the standard is that the word "office"
means "term of office." This argument is supported by several cases
in which an elected official was either removed or resigned from his
office, and was later reappointed or reelected to that same office for
the remaining term of office. In each of these cases, the courts refused to uphold the reinstatement of the officer. They held that
reelection could not apply to a new term of office which could not
come about until the old term of office had expired, since removal
from office was removal from that term of office.
In one situation, 29 a borough president in New York, was removed from office by the governor in 1907 for malfeasance.
Ahearn's term was to run from 1906 to 1910. He was appointed to
the office only a few days after removal by the Board of Aldermen
of the City of New York, who were designated by statute to fill
such vacancies by appointment. The New York Court of Appeals
denied the appointment stating that "such removal barred him
[Ahearn] from immediate appointment to fill the vacancy for the
unexpired term .... "30 The court said, however, that Ahearn could
be elected to "some other office or . . .be elected to a new term of

the same office, neither of which were in any way involved in his
trial and from neither of which he was removed."' 31 The court held,
then, that removal from office is removal from that term of office,
thereby equating the word "office" to "term of office."
In State ex rel. Thompson v. Crump,32 Edward H. ("Boss")
Crump had been ousted from the office of mayor of Memphis
under an act which declared in part "that any municipal officer who
shall become intoxicated, engage in gambling or violate any penal
statute involving moral turpitude, shall forfeit his office and be
ousted. ' 3 3 The term of office from which Crump had been ousted
ran from 1912 to 1916. In 1916, Crump was reelected as mayor of
Memphis, and it was alleged that because he had been ousted from
the office, Crump could not be reelected. The court held that:
29. People v. Ahearn, 196 N.Y. 221, 89 N.E. 930 (1909).
30. Id. at 234, 89 N.E. at 934.

31. Ibid.
32. 134 Tenn. 121, 183 S.W. 505 (1916).
33. Tenn. Laws 1915, ch. 11, § 1.
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A removal from office extends to the limit of the current term, but
such removal, unless a statute gives it greater effect, cannot go beyond the current term because the office itself is limited by the term.

If we go beyond the current term, then we have to deal with another
office.

34

The requirement in section 3-11-7 of the New Mexico statutes
which says that a candidate may have his name placed on the ballot
if he has a petition signed by a number of persons equal to three per
cent of the votes cast in one half of the counties "at the last general
election held of such office," should mean, therefore, that the number be based on the last general election for that term of office.
Section 3-11-7 places a burden on the person who has not been
chosen at the pre-primary election or party convention to represent
the party as a candidate for the office which he is seeking; but who,
nevertheless, is trying to have his name placed on the primary ballot. The "burden" placed on this person by section 3-11-7 is necessary if the number of names on the ballot is to be kept within reason.
The purpose of section 3-11-7, then, is not to make the candidate
who is seeking to have his name placed on the ballot show what
his chances of election are, but only to show a sufficient number of
supporters to make it worthwhile printing his name on the ballot;
and, also, to see if he would have had a chance of being nominated
if his candidacy had been declared before the pre-primary or the
convention. The only reasonable criteria that can be used is the vote
cast at the last election for the man who is to be succeeded. This is
certainly more reasonable than linking this requirement to the votes
cast for another office which is in no way connected with the office
the candidate is seeking.
One question remains to be answered before it can be determined
which election is meant by "the last general election for such office"
34. State ex rel. Thompson v. Crump, 134 Tenn. 121, 183 S.W. 505, 507 (1916). (Emphasis added.) Accord, State ex rel. Howell v. Sensing, 188 Tenn. 684, 222 S.W.2d 13,
15 (1949), where the court cited the Crump case in holding that "[T]he word 'office'
connotes 'office for a term', and that term is an entity and indivisible." The equality of
these terms is further supported by the New Mexico statutes. For example, N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 3-10-19 (1953), which prescribes the manner for filling a vacancy in the office of
United States Senator, reads as follows:
In the event that such vacancy shall occur within thirty [30] days next preceding
a general election, the person appointed by the governor to fill such vacancy shall
hold office until the next general election occurring more than thirty [30] days
subsequent to the happening of such vacancy unless the term of office of such
senatorshall sooner expire." (Emphasis added.)
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in section 3-11-7: What was the legislative intent ?35 In a New York
case,36 the court was called upon to interpret a constitutional section
which authorized the legislature to give the power of appointment
of municipal officers to village authorities. The court defined legislative intent as "the intent as gathered from the act itself, and sometimes considered in the light of our knowledge, in common with the
public at large of well-known conditions which may seem to have
led up to it." 37 A recent New Mexico decision has gone even further
in holding that "an interpretation of a statute will never be adopted
which will render the application thereof absurd or unreasonable." 3
If this New Mexico precedent on statutory construction is to be
followed, then section 3-1 1-7 must be interpreted to refer to the
number of votes cast for the candidates in the last election for the
expiring term of office and not the latest election for the type of
office for which the candidate is seeking election. Using the latter
standard would not only be inconsistent with the fact that office
connotes "term of office"; but it would also be unreasonable and
indefinite because of the possible double or triple burden it might
place on some candidate using the same procedure in a later election.
One attempting to have his name placed on the ballot pursuant to
section 3-11-7 must realize, however, that the problem of which
election "the last election for such office" refers to has not been decided. A candidate, in order to assure that his name will be placed
on the ballot, therefore, should use the largest number of votes cast
in the election based on either standard, i.e., the votes cast for all
the candidates in the latest election for that type of office for which
he is seeking election, or the last election for the expiring term of
office.
RONALD T. TAYLOR

35. "In construing statutes, the intent of the legislature must be given effect . ...
Montoya v. McManus, 68 N.M. 381, 389, 362 P.2d 771, 776 (1961). See Reese v. Dempsey, 48 N.M. 417, 424, 152 P.2d 157, 161 (1944), where the court said, "iT]he intention
of the legislature, in passing a statute, is the primary and controlling consideration in
determining its proper construction."
36. People ex rel. Mitchell v. Sturges, 27 App. Div. 387,50 N.Y. Supp. 5 (1898).
37. Id. at 390, 50 N.Y. Supp. at 7.
38. Montoya v. McManus, 68 N.M. 381, 389, 362 P.2d 771, 776 (1961). See note 35
supra. Cf. Nye v. Board of Comm'rs, 36 N.M. 169, 9 P.2d 1023 (1932) ; Hahn v. Sorgen,
50 N.M. 83, 171 P.2d 308 (1946).

